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such . . . hospital is located." But this statute does not seem to be
broad enough to include the furnishing of medical services except as
merely incidental to the hospitalization.
JEROME H. BROOKS
COUNTIES
LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES ARISING OUT OF LABOR
DISPUTES
Plaintiff instituted an action in the Common Pleas Court of Lucas
County against the County Board of Commissioners to recover damages
under sections 6278 and 6281 of the General Code for alleged injuries
sustained at the hands of a mob. The evidence revealed that the plaintiff
answered a knock at the door of his home only to be seized, assaulted,
and seriously injured. A strike was in progress at a nearby plant of the
Electric Auto-Lite Company and the plaintiff had been mistaken for a
strike-breaker by a group of the striking employees. The trial court
ordered a juror withdrawn and dismissed the petition, which action was
reversed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the trial court. Reynolds v. Lathrop, et al.,
Board of Commissioners of Lucas County, 133 Ohio St. 435, 14 N.E.
(2d) 599, 11 Ohio Op. 103 (1938).
Code section 6278, on which plaintiff relied, reads in part: "A
collection of people assembled for an unlawful purpose and intending to
do damage or injury to anyone, or pretending to exercise correctional
power over other persons by violence and without authority of law, shall
be deemed a 'mob'. . . . An act of violence by a mob upon the body
of any person shall constitute a 'lynching'. . . . " Section 6281 imposes
liability on the county in which a person is assaulted and lynched with
the maximum recovery set at five thousand dollars.
Statutes imposing liability for acts of mob violence on local govern-
mental subdivisions can be traced back to the time of King Canute
(994-1035). Reeves, History of the English Law, p. 30; I Holds-
worth, History of the English Law, p. I I; 22 Halsbury's, Laws of
England, p. 507. At Common Law no liability existed for either injuries
to person or property. Wakely v. Douglas County, io9 Neb. 396, 191
NAV. 337 (1922); Shake v. Board of Comm's of Sullivan County,
210 Ind. 6I, 1 N.E. (2d) 132 (1935); College of Medicine v. Cleve-
land, 12 Ohio St. 375 (186I); Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St.
625 (1885); Phillips Sheet Tin Plate Go. v. Griffith, Admx., 98 Ohio
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St. 73 (1918). Modern statutes are intended to punish the inhabitants
of towns and counties for permitting riots and induce them to suppress
and prevent the same by making it to their financial advantage. Butler
County v. Beaty, xi Ohio App. 111, 30 Ohio C.A. 391 (1919);
Butte Miners Union v. City of Butte, 58 Mont. 391, 194 Pac. 149,
13 A.L.R. 746 (1920); Clark Thread Co. v. Hudson County, 54
N.J.L. 265, 23 Atl. 820 (1892).
There is little question but that the state has the power to enact
legislation penalizing local divisions of government wherein mob vio-
lence occurs. Hagerstown v. Sehner, 37 Md. 18o (1872) ; Champaign
County v. Church, .4dmr., 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N.E. 50, 48 L.R.A.
738, 78 Am. St. Rep. 718 (19oo); Ely v. Niagara County, 36 N.Y.
297 (1867); Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211 (I868);Donoghue v.
Philadelphia, 2 Pa. St. 230 (1845). Unsuccessful constitutional objec-
tions have been raised on such grounds as due process, denial of the right
to a jury trial, taking of private property for public use, usurpation of
judicial power, impairing the obligation of contract, class legislation, and
the police power. Chicago v. Sturgess, 222 U.S. 33, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
92 (iii); Iola v. Birnbaum, 71 Kan. 6oo, 81 Pac. 197 (1905);
Champaign County v. Church, Zdmr., supra; Davidson v. City of New
York, 27 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 342 (1864); Re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Pa.
204 (1847); llegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. St. 397 (1879);
Wakely v. Douglas County, supra. Courts are not in agreement as to
whether a strict or liberal interpretation should be given the statute.
Kirkland v. 4llendale County, 128 S.C. 541, 123 S.E. 648 (1924);
Febock v. Jefferson County, 219 Wis. 154, 262 N.W. 588 (1935);
Lanham v. Buchannon, 97 W. Va. 339, 125 S.E. 157 (1924);
Yalenezian v. Boston, 238 Mass. 538, 131 N.E. 220 (1921); Wells,
Fargo & Co. v. Jersey City, 207 Fed. 871, aff. 135 C.C.A. 371
(1913). This division of opinion is evident in Ohio. Butler County v.
Beaty, supra; Phillips Sheet Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, Zdmx, supra;
Hammett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932); Lexa v.
Zumntetal., 123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82 (1931).
The original enactment in Ohio penalizing counties for acts of mob
violence was passed by the legislature in 1896 and was entitled "An
Act for the Suppression of Mob Violence." 92 Ohio Laws 136. The
present phraseology of the law came by an amendment in 1898. 93 Ohio
Laws 161. Code section 6278 of the General Code is given over to
definitions of the words "mob" and "lynching." It should be noted
that the first sentence of the section which defines "mob" is composed
of two clauses separated by the word "or." In the second clause of the
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sentence is found the term "correctional power." In Gray v. Gibson,
12 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 673, 22 Ohio Dec. N.P. 326 (i912) it was
stated that correctional power is exercised where "there are acts of vio-
lence against anyone who has committed a crime, as if to correct him."
A gathering of strike sympathizers endeavoring to frighten strike-
breakers was held not to constitute a mob exercising correctional power
on the ground that the strike-breakers had not and were not doing any-
thing but that which they had a legal right to do. Although the court
defined correctional power, no rule was laid down that this power must
be present in every case before a "mob" could exist under code section
6278. Shortly thereafter, arising out of somewhat similar facts, came
the case of Butler County v. Beaty, I I Ohio App. I I I, 30 Ohio C.A.
391 (1919) in which it was held that code section 6278 contemplated
the existence of two separate types of mobs, in only one of which was
the exercise of correctional power necessary. The court in effect read
the word "or," which separates the two clauses of the sentence defining
"mob," in its disjunctive and non-cumulative sense. By this decision a
mob could either be a collection of people assembled for an unlawful
purpose and intending to do damage or injury to anyone, or it could be
a collection of people pretending to exercise correctional power over
other persons by violence and without authority of law. Recovery was
allowed even though the plaintiff could not show himself to have been
the recipient of the exercise of correctional power. It is interesting to
observe that in this case the Supreme Court overruled a motion to certify
the record. 17 Ohio Law Rep. 346.
But the view expressed above was not to stand for long. Eight men
attempted to leave a restaurant without paying for services rendered. In
a scuffle which ensued, the plaintiff an employe of the establishment, was
shot in the leg. Action against the county was instituted under code
section 6278 and the Supreme Court laid down, in both the opinion and
the syllabus of the case, the rule that "to recover under such statute it
is not sufficient to show an injury resulting from acts of a collection of
people assembled for an unlawful purpose and intending to do damage
or injury to anyone, but there must appear also a purpose of exercising
correctional power by violence and without authority of law." In
arriving at this rule the court said that the word "or" between the two
clauses of the statute "must have been intended by the legislature to be
used in the sense which serves to relate similar ideas and connect them
to each other." Lexa v. Zumnt et al., Board of County Commissioners,
123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82 (1931).
In the principal case the court in a brief opinion rests its decision
104 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1938
squarely on the rule laid down in the Lexa Case, which requires the
presence of correctional power to sustain a recovery. The court in the
principal case then proceeded to define correctional power as "an unlaw-
ful attempt by a mob to mete out justice to a real or supposed wrongdoer
without awaiting the lawfully constituted authorities." Finding that the
strikers who assaulted the plaintiff were acting for their own selfish and
personal ends and not in aid of law and order, the court dismissed the
case as the needed correctional power was absent.
Returning to the case of Lexa v. Zumnt et al., supra where the rule
applied in the principal case was first enunciated, one finds that its pro-
nouncement was not necessary to a determination of the case. The Court
of Appeals had held that plaintiff could not recover as the evidence did
not show a collection of people assembled for an unlawful purpose and
intending to do damage or injury to anyone, as is required by the first
clause of the definition of "mob" as found in code section 6278. The
Court of Appeals in turn disposed of the case without having to deter-
mine whether correctional power had been exercised. Zumnt et al. v.
Lexa, 37 Ohio App. 479, 175 N.E. 458 (1930). Although the Su-
preme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, the court gratuitously added
that in such cases it was also necessary that correctional power be exer-
cised on the plaintiff before he would be allowed a recovery. This
dictum was incorporated into the syllabus of the case from which place it
was taken bodily and applied as the rule of law to determine the princi-
pal case.
clauses of the first sentence of code section 6278 as meaning "and."
This is permissible in interpreting a statute only where the context or
other provisions of the statute requires it, or when it is necessary to avoid
an absurd or impossible consequence and to carry out the evident intent
of the legislature. It must be presumed that the language of the statute
was chosen with due regard to grammatical propriety. Black, Interpre-
tation of Laws, p. 231; Rice v. U. S., 53 Fed. 910, 4 C.C.A. 104
(1893); Ohio Fuel Supply Co. v. Paxton, i IFed. (2nd) 740 (1926).
The original staute in 1896 was passed as a result of the activities of the
"Klu Klux Klan" and similar organizations. Zumnt et al. v. Lexa,
supra. The purpose stated in the title of the Act was to suppress mob
violence and when this is read in connection with the events which made
its passage necessary, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature
intended to give relief to those persons who suffered from acts of mob
violence, whether it be acts of lynching, mutilation, whippings, or tarring
and feathering. It is also reasonable to suppose that this relief was to be
given from the activities of the Klan and similar organizations in cases
where the wrong eminated from an intolerance toward the race, color,
creed, or personal habits of the victim, as well as in those cases where
the mob acts solely to mete out justice to a real or supposed wrongdoer.
It is submitted that by denying relief except in those cases where the
mob is attempting to mete out justice to a real or supposed wrongdoer
is not only defeating the intent of the legislature to a great extent, but
is also going counter to the accepted rule that the word "or" in a statute
should not be read as meaning "and" except where it is necessary to
carry out the evident intent of the legislature. In this connection it is
interesting to observe the court's own statement in Phillips Sheet Tin
Plate Co. v. Griffith, Admx., 98 Ohio St. 73 (1918) that the statute
was remedial and merited a liberal construction. Nor does the Lexa
case or the principal case make any reference to the decision in Butler
County ir. Beaty, supra where it was held that the word "or" was to
be read in its disjunctive sense.
Under the definition of correctional power in the principal case as
being those instances in which a mob is attempting to mete out justice
to a real or supposed wrongdoer without awaiting the lawfully consti-
tuted authorities, it would seem that it is necessary for the members
of the mob to know or believe that the person being subjected to violence
has acted in such fashion as to deserve punishment at the hands of the
law. But cases may be easily supposed where an individual may be the
object of the wrath of a mob, not because he is a real or supposed wrong-
doer in the sense of having violated the law, but because his religious,
political, social, industrial, or domestic beliefs and activities conflict with
those held by other persons who undertake to effect a change by an
appeal to force rather than to reason. In the former instance, following
the rule of the principal case recovery would be permitted the injured
party and the proceeds would go for the maintenance and education of
the plaintiff's dependants. In the latter instances these same dependants
would not only be denied recovery, but might also be faced by a loss
of the earning power of the head of the family, with the not impossible
consequence of being committed to a life of poverty or dependency on
the state for the necessaries of life. The court in determining the intent
of the legislature should take into consideration those social consequences
which might arise from a particular construction of the statute.
The labor field in the past few years has given rise to many
instances of mob violence. Persons have been seriously injured and
earning capacity impaired through no fault of victim. These persons
have turned to the law for redress against lawless bands. This is evi-
denced by the fact that of the six known cases brought under code section
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6278, four have arisen out of strikes. By the decision in the principal
case this avenue of redress has been materially narrowed. If the intent
of the legislature was to strike at all mob violence, then this intent has
been defeated. Gone also is the salutary effect of the law in inducing
the inhabitants of counties to refrain from mob violence on penalty of
increased taxes to pay verdicts secured again~st the county wherein the
mob acted. It would seem that as the law now stands the only persons
entitled to recover under the statute are those persons taken from the
hands of the authorities and cases where the mob "beats" the law-
enforcing agencies to the scene and vents its wrath on a real or supposed
wrongdoer who is thought to have violated the law. Many of these
victims would doubtless be guilty of the offense and deserve legal pun-
ishment. On the other side of the picture are those persons who are
assaulted and lynched by mobs and who are entirely within their legal
rights and guilty of no violation of law, and this fact is at that time
perfectly recognized by the mob who attacks them. But this group is
wholly unprotected. It seems that no distinction should be made to the
prejudice of wholly innocent and law abiding citizens. It is to be hoped
that the court will see its way dear to modify the construction of the
statute so as to include within it those victims of mob violence who are
neither real nor supposed wrongdoers in the sense of having violated
the law. VERNON LEE
DIVORCE
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE - ACTION OF DIVORCE AND
ALIMONY
The Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County in a decree of
divorce awarded custody of one child to the plaintiff and alimony of
$6o.oo per month for the support of herself and the child, which the
court, at a subsequent term, modified to $45.00 per month. On motion
of the defendant to vacate a judgment for payments in default and to
modify the decree, the court reduced the alimony payments to $20.00
per month for the support of the child until 21 years of age and also
ordered the defendant to pay $25.00 a month on the judgment for
accrued alimony until satisfied. The court of appeals held that the
jurisdiction of the court in cases of alimony was continuing and affirmed
the judgment.'
This note deals with the power of the court to modify decrees of
'Heckert v. Heckert, 57 Ohio App. 421, 14 N.E. (zd) 428 (936).
